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“The support afforded by the
air force was faultless”
The Royal Air Force and the Raid
on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
Ross Mahoney

O

peration Jubilee, the raid
on Dieppe, 19 August 1942,
maintains a specific place in Canada’s
cultural memory of the Second World
War. Charles Stacey, the Canadian
army official historian, stated in
1948 that, “The raid on Dieppe was
perhaps the most hotly-discussed
operation of the war.”1 The debate
over Dieppe is best represented by
the duologue between Brian Loring
Villa and Peter Henshaw over the
role of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbatten and the Chiefs of Staff
Committee in the authorisation of
Jubilee, which came to fruition in
the pages of The Canadian Historical
Review in 1998.2
The debates over Jubilee can
be transplanted onto the role of the
Royal Air Force (RAF) in the raid.
Villa has argued that, “There was a
degree of callousness in [Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles] Portal’s [chief
of the air staff] allowing a largely
Canadian force to go in without
the bomber support they needed.”3
This fallacious argument, based on
hindsight and a lack of understanding
of the RAF’s capability at this point
in the war, requires revision. The
historiography on Jubilee has failed
to contextualise the RAF’s role in
the raid. Accounts polarise between
triumphalism or criticism of the RAF’s
claims. Most fail to grasp the context
in which the RAF launched the raid.

Abstract: The failure of Operation
Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, has partially
been attributed to the failure of the
RAF to provide the bomber support
needed to support the landings.
This fallacious argument, based on
hindsight and a lack of understanding
of the RAF’s capabilities at this
point in the war, requires revision.
This article examines the doctrinal
and operational context of the RAF
forces involved in Jubilee. Prewar
combined operations doctrine stated
that the key role for air power was
the maintenance of air superiority.
The absence of heavy bombers at
Dieppe did not doom the operation.
The RAF contributed significantly to
the operation by seeking to battle
the Luftwaffe in the manner that
it did during Jubilee, and as such,
it provided the most appropriate
protection that it could for the assault
forces.

The only work that examines the
RAF’s experience remains Norman
Franks’ narrative account, which fails
to analyse key factors of the RAF’s
performance.4
This article examines the doctrinal
and operational context of the RAF’s
involvement in Jubilee and deals with
the key question of lessons learnt.
It contends that prewar combined
operations doctrine argued that the
key role for air power was to maintain
air superiority in order to protect
assaulting forces. It then considers
this alongside the development of
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the offensive use of RAF Fighter
Command in the period 1940-1942.
In understanding the twin pillars of
doctrine and operations, this article
challenges the revisionist argument
that the failure of the RAF to supply
bombers doomed Jubilee. It argues
that in actually seeking to battle the
Luftwaffe in the manner that it did
during Jubilee it provided the most
appropriate protection that it could
for the assault forces.

A Doctrinal Problem

I

n early June 1940, the Prime Minister
Winston Churchill called for the
“Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose me
measures for a vigorous, enterprising
and ceaseless offensive” against
German held territory. 5 Churchill
believed that these operations would
have strategic effect and the increasing
size of the raids up to Jubilee
illustrates their growing importance
in British strategy. This led to the
appointment of Lieutenant-General
Alan Bourne (Royal Marines) as
“Commander of Raiding Operations
on coasts in enemy occupation and
Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on
Combined Operations” on 14 June
1940.6 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger
Keyes replaced Bourne on 17 July as
director of Combined Operations,
as Churchill believed Bourne would
not question Admiralty orders that
17
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RAF gun camera footage showing an attack
on a German twin-engined aircraft, likely
a Dornier DO 17, over Dieppe, 19 August
1942. The footage a sequence, starting
at the top, of the fighter approaching and
then opening fire on the aircraft. In the final
frame the German bomber has been hit in
the starboard engine which begins to smoke.
The fate of this aircraft is not known.
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undermined his position. Keyes
founded Combined Operations
Headquarters (COHQ) and led it
until 27 October 1941 when the young
and ambitious Captain Mountbatten
replaced him. Keyes was replaced
because of ongoing disputes with
Churchill over the latter’s desire to retitle his role as advisor to the Chiefs of
Staff on Combined Operations.
The focus on strategic aspects of
Jubilee has led historians to ignore its
doctrinal context. A consideration of
the doctrine that informed operational
decisions is useful in highlighting
the context of the RAF’s decision to
utilise a supporting force that was
predicated on the use of fighters to
fight for air superiority.
During the interwar period, the
key question that vexed experts on
combined operations was whether
18 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
Published

they could be successful in the face of
opposing air power. In 1923, the RAF
produced Air Staff Memorandum
No.10, which noted that a combined
operation against an enemy who
had air superiority was “doomed
to failure.”7 This did not mean that
they considered combined operations
impossible, quite the opposite.
Throughout this period, the RAF
considered its primary objective
in combined operations as being
the attainment of air superiority.
For example, during the 16th Staff
Course at the RAF Staff College in
1938, Group Captain Ronald Graham
noted in his lecture, “Introduction to
Combined Operations,” that while
the addition of air power to the
pantheon of war had complicated
the character of combined operations,
“we should not allow the question of

air opposition to obscure the value of
the exercise.”8
In 1919, Major-General Warren
Hastings Anderson, commandant
at the Army Staff College, noted in
the first combined operations staff
exercise following the First World
War that in the future this form of
operation had to take account of all
three services. Anderson stressed
that any new Manual of Combined
Operations should take note of the
“views and requirements” of the RAF
who “must of course be included in
it.”9 The importance of air superiority
was enunciated as early as 1922,
when Air Vice-Marshal John Higgins,
director of training and staff duties,
and the RAF representative on the
Altham Committee, noted in a paper
entitled “Some Aspects of Combined
Operations in so far as they affect the
3
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of interpretations about how to
attain this state during the interwar
period. The historiography of the
RAF’s development has stressed its
focus on bombing as the means of
achieving air superiority.13 This was
not an infallible conclusion in an era
of rapidly changing technological
fortunes. In a lecture on “Air
Warfare” in 1925, the commandant
of the RAF Staff College, Air ViceMarshal Robert Brooke-Popham,
noted that three key methods existed,
fighting in the air, bombardment, and
destruction of means of production.14
The 1925 Manual of Combined
Operations noted that air superiority
could be achieved through the
application of indirect air power
through the destruction of enemy
air forces, lines of communication,
demoralisation of personnel and the
civilian population, and destruction
of material by bombing. Fighters
were limited to providing direct air
cover over the beachhead.15 By the
time of the 1938 edition of the Manual
of Combined Operations, it had become
apparent that fighter aircraft should
take on a greater range of operations.
The provision of adequate fighter
cover through the offensive use of
fighter patrols became one of the
three main uses of air power in
support of combined operations,
along with bombardment, and the
provision of smoke screens. The
increasing scope of the 1938 edition
of the manual within the context of

the changing technological landscape
shows there had been an increasing
realisation that fighters could take
on offensive roles. In a lecture to the
Army Staff College in 1938, Graham
noted the increasing use of fighters
but also stressed the problem of
achieving air superiority without
denuding the operation of surprise,
which was considered vital.16 This
issue would take on importance
during the planning of Jubilee.
By the outbreak of the Second
World War, it was widely accepted
that air superiority was a necessary
pre-requisite for success in combined
operations. Air Vice-Marshal Richard
Peirse, deputy chief of the air staff
(DCAS), noted in 1938 that, “One
of the greatest difficulties in this
form of operation will be the need
for establishing a favourable air
situation.”17 By the time of Jubilee
operational experience proved this
belief correct.

The Need for Air Superiority

I

n the two years after the formation of
COHQ there was little opportunity
for the utilisation of air power in
support of small-scale raiding
operations. Not until Operation
Archery, the British commando raid
on Vaagso, Norway in December
1941, did the first truly joint combined
operation take place.18 A pattern was
set during Archery that was based
on the beliefs that underpinned

Library and Archives Canada PA 210151

Royal Air Force,” that the primary
role for the RAF was air superiority
and aerial interdiction. The Altham
Committee was formed as a joint
service committee under the chair of
Captain Edward Altham, Royal Navy
in order to revise the 1913 edition of
the Manual of Combined Operations.
It evolved out of discussions at the
Army Staff College and the formation
of the Dawney Committee in 1920,
which met to revise the relevant
chapter on combined operations in
the Army’s Field Service Regulations.
The Altham Committee supervised
the production of the Provisional
1922 Manual of Combined Naval,
Military and Air Operations that was
formalised in 1925. 10 Throughout
the period, the Manual of Combined
Operations remained a jointly authored
publication produced under the
auspices of the Admiralty. Higgins
highlighted the RAF’s argument that
it considered a combined operation
as that between more than any one
service. For the RAF the methods it
employed in achieving air superiority
were equally applicable to any form
of “joint” operation. 11 This broad
view sat outside of the scope of
the doctrine, which focussed on
amphibious operations involving
all three services due to the RN’s
control of the manual’s production
and publication.
Air superiority remained the
cornerstone of the Manual of Combined
Operations throughout the interwar
years. The manual was updated
in 1922, 1925, 1931 and 1938. The
RAF’s strategic doctrine of the
period, AP 1300 The War Manual,
defined air superiority as a “state
of moral, physical and material
superiority” over the enemy that
would allow freedom of action. 12
This fluidic definition of the hubris
of air superiority allowed a number
RAF fighter pilots gather for a group
photo after the Dieppe Raid.
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Not visible over the beaches at Dunkirk in 1940, the army dubbed the RAF the “Royal
Absent Force.” In fact, RAF operations to protect the beach and the Royal Navy from
Luftwaffe attacks was conducted some distance from the battlefield and was a major
factor in the success of the operation.

the Manual of Combined Operations,
and had been illustrated through
broader operational experience.
Five fighter squadrons (long-range
Bristol Beaufighters and Blenheims)
and two squadrons of Handley Page
Hampdens supported Archery. Their
primary mission was to provide air
superiority.
While the RAF lacked knowledge
of raiding style combined operations,
it did have experience in other forms
of amphibious operations from the
Norwegian Campaign, the Dunkirk
evacuation and the Battle of Britain in
1940 to reinforce its belief regarding
the importance of air superiority.
Norway illustrated the problem of
conducting a combined operation at
the end of long and insecure logistics
tail. The RAF was unable to build up
enough strength to support ground
forces while the RN failed to provide
adequate carrier air cover in the
initial phase. The inability to establish
forward air bases led Major-General
Bernard Paget, the commander of a
British force in Norway, to remark
that “all the lessons of peacetime
exercises” had been forgotten.19 The
20 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
Published

problem of building up air strength
during a combined operation was
considered in numerous exercises
during the interwar period with
few adequate solutions found. 20
Conversely, the Luftwaffe provided
effective support in what has been
described as the first modern joint
campaign.21
The nature of the counter air
operations undertaken by the RAF
during Operation Dynamo at Dunkirk
earned it the unfortunate epithet
of the “Royal Absent Force.”22 The
operations were primarily concerned
with providing air cover over the
evacuation area utilising offensive
operations. Seventy-five percent of
operations conducted by the RAF
during Dynamo consisted of fighter
sweeps by large-scale formations
from Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park’s
No.11 Group. The success of the RAF
aided the RN’s ability to withdraw
forces and Admiral Bertram Ramsey
signalled on 29 May that, “I am
most grateful for your splendid
cooperation. It alone has given us
a chance of success.” 23 Air ViceMarshal James Robb, deputy chief

of combined operations, noted that
Dynamo was a combined operation in
reverse and that until the experience
of Dynamo and Norway the use of
air power in support of combined
operations had been a theoretical
concern based on beliefs. He noted
that recent experience had proven
those beliefs, suggesting that, “If the
enemy has a powerful air force, we
must prevent him somehow or other
from interfering with our landing and
our lines of communications.”24
The Battle of Britain highlighted
the significance of air superiority
in defeating a planned combined
operation. While debate remains
over the exact aims of the Luftwaffe’s
air campaign it is clear that
preparations were made to invade.
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(OKW) planning documents clearly
indicate that for Operation Seelöwe
to succeed the Luftwaffe would have
to wrest control of the air from the
RAF. Hitler’s Führer Directive No.16
made this the primary prerequisite
of future operations while an OKW
directive of 2 July concluded that the
“Invasion of England is quite possible
under certain conditions of which
the most important is the gaining
of air superiority.”25 The RAF noted
that the initial phase of the battle
would consist of attacks against
airfields and factories in an attempt
to bring Fighter Command to battle
and attrite its strength supported
this view. 26 The RAF’s ability to
hold off Luftwaffe attacks led to
a shift in strategy towards attacks
predicated on coercion. The RAF’s
success illustrated that its interwar
belief on the difficulty of gaining air
superiority in face of first class air
power had been prescient in the test
of battle. This would prove important
for Jubilee.
In the aftermath of the Battle
of Britain, RAF Fighter Command
launched a strategic fighter offensive
that sought to bring the Luftwaffe to
battle and attrite its strength. This
strategy of “leaning forward into
5
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been virtually stalemated
France” began as early as 21
due to the tactical advantage
October 1940 when Park was
enjoyed by the Luftwaffe. When
ordered to take the offensive
viewed in conjunction with
when weather and lack of
27
an appreciation of combined
enemy activity warranted it.
operations doctrine, the
This strategy provided the
experience of 1941 and 1942
operational context for RAF
and the orders issued to Leighoperations during Jubilee. Air
Mallory on 13 April provide the
Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas,
operational context for No.11
air officer commander-in-chief
Group’s operations over Dieppe.
of Fighter Command, and the
The experience reinforced the
new head of No.11 Group, Air
belief underpinning the RAF’s
Vice-Marshal Trafford Leighinvolvement in combined
Mallory, vigorously pursued it
operations doctrine in the
throughout 1941 and 1942.
interwar years, the need for air
Throughout 1941, Fighter
superiority.
Command sought to define
The RAF also participated
its role as the RAF went from
in training for combined
the defensive to the offensive.
operations. In November
Operations in 1941 consisted
1941, as the scale of combined
primarily of Rodeo, Rhubarb
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was the air
operations increased, COHQ
and Circus operations. Circus
officer commanding No.11 Group and as such was the
was provided with an air
operation made use of bombers
air commander for the Dieppe operation.
advisor in the form of Group
of No.2 Group, Bomber
Captain Alfred Willetts. 32 It
Command. These operations
required effective co-operation
these with fighter sweeps in order
became clear to Mountbatten that
between the two commands and,
to attrite Luftwaffe strength, though
there was a need to train the RAF
in early 1941, they were not always
he was to conserve strength where
in the requirements of combined
successful. From mid-1941 onwards,
possible until the introduction of
operations and test the beliefs of
the fighter offensive took on greater
more effective aircraft.29 In 1941 and
interwar doctrine. Air Chief Marshal
strategic importance as it sought
Sir Charles Portal, chief of the air
1942, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory
keep Luftwaffe forces away from the
staff, agreed. The director of plans,
faced the problem of balancing
eastern front. Operations continued
Air Commodore William Dickson,
issues of technological change, which
into 1942, and on 13 April Leighexamined the issue with the view to
affected the question of wastage, and
Mallory was ordered:
posting a “competent” body of men
the strategic requirements of Fighter
to work with the RN and Army at
Command’s new role in the British
COHQ.33 This group of officers would
war effort. This led to discussion on
(a) To pick targets right on the coast,
the applicability of the offensive. An
form the core of No.1441 Combined
and not try to penetrate.
exchange of views between Douglas
Operations Development Flight that
(b) To carry out a proportion of…
and his senior air staff officer, Air
was based at the Combined Training
operations without bombers at all,
Commodore Douglas Evill, in
Centre at Inveraray. This unit tested
since the Hun [was] apparently ready
March 1941 saw Evill contend that
problems that arose as air power
to react even though no bombers
Circus operations at the time were
began to be utilised in ever expanding
[were] present.
ineffective and should be curtailed
roles by COHQ.34
(c) To employ large numbers of
or stopped until a new method
Training of operational units
squadrons with a view to outwas found for their employment.30
in the RAF’s functional commands
numbering the Hun.28
assumed even greater importance
However, Douglas argued that a
in 1942 as planning for large-scale
curtailment of operations would
This revised directive was based
operations took priority. On 16
not be advantageous, though he
on the issue of wastage that had
February Portal told Mountbatten
did agree that there was need for
plagued the offensive in 1941 which
that six squadrons were earmarked
further training.31 While the offensive
led to Douglas’ operational policy
for training with the expeditionary
being amended on 13 March 1942.
provided Fighter Command with
force while the director of fighter
Douglas was ordered to resume
the opportunity to “lean forward
operations, Air Commodore John
Circus operations and supplement
into France,” by mid-1942, it had
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/3
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Pilots from No.401 RCAF Squadron rest
between sorties, 19 August 1942.

Whitworth-Jones, noted that 15
squadrons were available for training.
It was expected that the training
regime of No.1441 Flight would
mirror Fighter Command’s, as it was
this command that would provide
the bulk of forces for any operations.
Bomber Command was expected to
provide units from No.2 Group for
training.35
By 31 March, commands were
ordered by the DCAS to, “press
forward as rapidly as possible with
training and preparation for combined
operations.”36 Douglas was expected
to provide units for training as well
as supporting Army Co-Operation
Command in the preparation of
fighter-reconnaissance operations.
Training fell into two categories of
operations: air cover over the area of
the operation and support of ground
troops in the land phase of the
battle.37 Air Marshal Arthur Harris,
the head of Bomber Command, raised
questions over the draft orders issued
to Bomber Command. He replied to
a letter from the vice-chief of the air
Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred
Freeman, in his usual acerbic tones
when he described it as training for
“hypothetical operations.”38 Despite
Harris’ objection, by May 1942
training for Combined Operations
became a vital aspect of the functional
commands’ commitments. DCAS
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informed Douglas on 1 May that his
priorities were:
(a) The intensification of the day
fighter offensive which calls for
reinforcement of 11 Group with
Spitfire squadrons.
(b) Maintenance of a proper state of
readiness of squadrons ear-marked
for operation “Region”
(c) The training of fighter squadrons
in rotation in Combined Operation39

In the same month, No.239 Squadron
was the first unit to go through the
training at RAF Abbotsinch and
would later serve during Jubilee.
By the time of Jubilee, the RAF was
prepared to provide the increasing
support needed for the ever-larger
raids being conducted by COHQ.

Planning and the
Bombing Issue

T

he origins of Rutter/Jubilee lay
in Anglo-American discussions
in early 1942 to increase the scale and
frequency of raids.40 On 18 April, the
Chiefs of Staff Committee approved
a memorandum that stated that raids
were “to be undertaken in the summer
of 1942 on the largest scale that the
available equipment will permit.”41
These discussions fell under the
larger hubris of decisions concerning

Operation Sledgehammer/Roundup
and the debate over the invasion of
Europe in 1942. It had a clear impact
on the RAF because as combined
operations increased in scale they
would require greater air support.
This increase had the advantage
of allowing Fighter Command to
continue its policy of offensive air
operations against the Luftwaffe as
outlined in the air staff’s directive to
Douglas on 13 March.
The first consideration of Dieppe
as a target for an operation occurred
at a meeting of the Target Committee
of COHQ on 3 April.42 From here,
an outline plan was produced and
Mountbatten received approval for
Rutter on 13 May.43 The plan that
emerged envisaged a frontal assault
on Dieppe proceeded by bombing
of the town and airborne assaults
on the gun positions on headlands
overlooking the town.44 By the time
the final air plan for Rutter emerged
the bombing of Dieppe itself had
been removed, and by the time of
Jubilee the use of airborne forces had
been replaced by commando assaults
from the sea. As early as 14 April,
Willets, Mountbatten’s air advisor
on combined operations, questioned
the use of airborne troops.45 However,
Major-General Frederick Browning,
commander of Britain’s airborne
forces, lobbied for their use.46 The
key issue related to the allocation
of transport squadrons equipped
with bombers that could be used
in on-going Bomber Command
operations. For example, on 11 May
Harris requested that Nos.12 and 142
Squadrons be given over to Bomber
Command for use in Operation
Millennium, the thousand bomber
raid on Cologne on the night of
30/31 May 1942. While not used, it
highlights the problems facing the

7
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ships HM Ships Calpe and Fernie
provided control of close support
aircraft with links to Leigh-Mallory
at Uxbridge; Air Commodore Cole on
the Calpe represented Leigh-Mallory.
Cole was instructed to liaise with the
other force commanders and direct
low-level operations.
During the course of the raid,
the RAF provided constant air
cover with operations split into five
phases starting at 0445 hours and
finishing at 2245 hours. In total, 70
RAF squadrons and four US Eighth
Army Air Force squadrons were
tasked to support Jubilee. The first
phase, 0445 hours to 0550 hours, saw
attacks on the beaches and defences
with Douglas Bostons laying smoke
while escorted bombers attacked the
beach front. Wing Commander G.C.
Surplice of No.226 Squadron flew one
of the first smoke laying operations
of the day and reported taking off
in the dark and encountering light
anti-aircraft fire during the operation.
His aircraft was attacked by a FockeWulf FW190, which his gunner, Pilot
Officer L.J. Longhurst, claimed as it
turned away with smoke pouring
from its engine.53 At the same time
Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers
and Supermarine Spitfires attacked
gun batteries on the flanks, which

were assaulted by Nos.3 and 4
Commando. In the second phase,
0550 hours to 0730 hours, air cover
and ad hoc direct support were
provided. For example, at 0645 hours,
No.88 Squadron provided support to
the Royal Regiment of Canada that
was being held up at Puys on Blue
Beach. The third phase, 0730 hours to
1030 hours, saw the RAF tasked with
providing air cover for operations
on the ground. This was the greatest
period of activity for the RAF with “20
to 30 fighters being constantly in the
area.” The penultimate phase, 1030
hours to 1410 hours, saw the RAF
continue to provide air cover while
the withdrawal from the beaches was
undertaken. Additionally, limited
direct air support was provided for
the withdrawing forces. During this
phase Luftwaffe tactics against the
attacking forces changed with larger
mixed formations of fighters, fighterbombers and bombers being utilized.
The final phase, 1410 hours to 2245
hours, saw air cover provided for the
fleet returning to the UK.54
The operation cost the RAF 108
aircraft while Luftwaffe records
show that their losses totalled no
more than 48 aircraft with the loss
of 21 fighter pilots. 55 However, it
was initially assumed that RAF and

Canadian Forces Photo PL 10706

airborne force in 1942. The problems
of allocating transport squadrons
reduced the commitment of the
airborne division to one battalion by
1 June.
The final air plan for Rutter
visualized five key roles for the
RAF; diversionary night bombing,
the transport of airborne troops, air
cover, reconnaissance and direct air
support.47 It was expected that 110
bombing sorties would take place
as a diversion against Boulogne and
two other undecided targets.48 After
Exercise Yukon II, it was decided
that Rutter would take place on 4
July, however, prevailing weather
conditions led to its postponement
and eventual cancellation after 8
July. The debate over the decision to
remount the operation has been well
documented.49 However, by 14 July
the operation had been resurrected as
Jubilee.50 It is clear that Leigh-Mallory
was supportive of any decision
to remount Rutter. 51 The revised
Jubilee air plan saw the RAF focus
on providing air cover with direct
air support a secondary priority.
These operations continued through
the daylight hours with the most
intensive periods coming during the
landing and withdrawal. Low-level
fighter and bomber attacks supported
assault forces and provided smokelaying where appropriate. Aircraft
from Army Co-Operation Command
provided tactical reconnaissance
within the battle area and along
the lines of approach to Dieppe. 52
While Dieppe was not bombed, a
diversionary raid remained part of
the plan with aircraft from the US 8th
Army Air Force attacking the airfield
at Abbeville, a purely military target.
Command and control was provided
through No.11 Group Headquarters
at RAF Uxbridge. The headquarters
A Spitfire from a Canadian squadron is
refuelled following a sortie to Dieppe,
19 August 1942.
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A formation of aircraft over Dieppe, 19 August 1942
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wounded and able to be return to
service. However, the Luftwaffe
lost 38 percent of its fighter pilots as
killed while another 29 percent were
classified as missing.61 The Luftwaffe
suffered an attrition of 67 percent, a
rate that was unacceptable for the
return that occurred during Jubilee.
From 1942 onwards, there was a
general decline in both the quality
and quantity of German fighter
pilots; therefore, a high attrition rate
exacerbated the problem.62
Despite its relative success, the
key criticism of the RAF’s planning
for Jubilee lay in the decision to
cancel the pre-bombardment that
had been part of the initial outline
plan for Operation Rutter. Villa
has noted that, “Without heavy
air bombardment, the disparity
in fire-power proved fatal to the
Canadian and British invaders.”63
This fatalistic post-facto analysis has
percolated into recent works with
historian Robin Neillands writing
that Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s
decision to cancel the bombing,
“fundamentally undermined the
possibilities of success at Dieppe.”64
While bomber support may have

aided the attackers, the planners had
to contend with considerations that
would have ameliorated against its
effectiveness. These considerations
include the applicability of use of
bombers to the raid and the issue of
authorisation from the War Cabinet.
The Manual of Combined
Operations contended that the use
of bombing depended on, “the
number of aircraft available and
other operations required of them,”
and that, “In most cases the general
struggle for air superiority, local
operations in defence of the landing
against enemy aircraft, and spotting
and reconnaissance duties will have
prior claims.” 65 In this light, the
decision can be viewed as conforming
to prescribed doctrine. The use
of heavy bombers also faced the
problem of denuding the operation
of surprise. While this contention
may appear as fallacious reasoning
for what some have claimed was
a poor operational decision, it was
based on operational experience.
The growing scale of raids in 1942
had seen greater use of air power
that had not always been successful.
During Operation Chariot, the raid

Canadian Forces Photo PMR 86-246

Luftwaffe losses were even. At a War
Cabinet meeting on 22 August the
foreign secretary, Sir Anthony Eden,
described the Luftwaffe as having
been roughly handled. 56 LeighMallory claimed that “Reports since
received indicate that the German
Air Force…lost between 150 and
200 aircraft.”57 Despite this apparent
discord between Leigh-Mallory’s
claim and the actual records, the key
indicator of the RAF’s relative success
on the day relates to pilot losses.
Of RAF losses, 33 percent of pilots
were classified as safe.58 This means
that they were picked up either by
friendly craft or by the air/sea rescue
(ASR) organisation. Leigh-Mallory
in his covering letter to his report
to the secretary of state for air on
Jubilee praised the work of the ASR
organisation and lamented the loss
of several of the Dover station’s craft,
which had been operating outside of
the range of the air cover umbrella.59
These were the last vessels to leave
the battle area and some of the last
missions performed by the RAF were
to provide air cover for these vessels.60
Additionally, another 13 percent
of pilots were classified injured or
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the meeting on 5 June. Finally, a key
issue facing planners was a standing
order from the War Cabinet relating
to the use of heavy bombers over
occupied territory. Mountbatten had
noted this issue in a meeting of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee as early as
13 May and it was fully explored in
his appreciation for Rutter.72
Even before the fall of France in
June 1940, the War Cabinet laid down
rules governing bombing in France.
These were amended in July 1940
to take account of the armistice and
drew attention to the concerns raised
over targets where civilian casualties
could be incurred. 73 Sir Archibald
Sinclair, the secretary of state for
air, directed that military objectives
could be attacked in France. They
included military forces, works and
fortifications, establishments and
depots, shipyards and factories, lines
of communications and transport,
and other objectives of military
necessity. While this suggests that
bombing could have been used
to support Rutter/Jubilee it is the
reference in paragraph 3 of the Annex,
which highlights the complexity of
the issues that hampered Bomber
Command operations in this sphere.
It noted that:
3. Bombardment by naval and air
forces is to be confined to military
objectives and must be subject to the

following general principles:
(a) The intentional bombardment of
civil populations as such is illegal.
(b) It must be possible to identify the
objective.
(c) The attack must be made with
reasonable care to avoid undue loss
of civil life in the vicinity of the target.
(d) The provisions of Red Cross
conventions are to be observed.74

This made Harris adamant that if
Bomber Command was to be used
then it had to be under conditions
that fitted these considerations. Thus,
cancelling the pre-bombardment
made sense given that these
conditions could not be guaranteed,
and that it might risk the loss of
surprise.
The bombing of targets in France
was a sensitive political subject that
affected the conduct of combined
operations. The St. Nazaire raid
highlighted the problem of accurate
targeting in occupied-territory as
cloud cover had abrogated the
bombers’ effective use.75 It is clear
that Churchill’s policy towards the
bombing of France was guided by
four key concerns. First, the fear of
pushing the Vichy regime into the
hands of Germany. Second, Churchill
did not want to damage relations
with the US who maintained links
with Vichy having granted them
full diplomatic recognition. Third,

Canadian Forces Photo PMR 81-6978

on St. Nazaire on 28 March 1942, the
use of bombers alerted the defenders
to the approaching operation due to
their peculiar bombing patterns and
they failed to provide the planned
diversion.66 The inclusion of bombers
for Rutter was based on the insistence
of the other services. On 21 April,
it was accepted that the target
would be Dieppe itself. 67 Despite
its initial inclusion in the planning
for Rutter direct bombing of Dieppe
was removed at the meeting on 5
June. However, diversionary attacks
remained an important element of
air plans for both Rutter and Jubilee.
Direct bombing was removed
for several reasons. First, the issue
of surprise was paramount in LeighMallory’s reasoning. This was based
on operational experience. Second,
Harris noted that for operational
reasons any attack would have to
go in after morning twilight. Given
the tight schedule of operations
for Rutter, this would leave the
bombers a window of five minutes
for any operation. 68 After the
decision was taken to remount the
operation as Jubilee Leigh-Mallory
made this operational factor clear
in an undated memorandum on
“The Employment on Bombers”
that was certainly circulated before
the meeting at COHQ on 24 July
despite Villa’s claim that this was
produced in September 1943.69 LeighMallory made clear the difficulty
of coordinating Bomber Command
operations with the requirements of
the operation.70 The primary aim of
the RAF was to provide effective air
cover, and battle the Luftwaffe for air
superiority, and thus the appearance
of bombers five minutes before the
attack would cause problems.71 The
concern of causing casualties to
assaulting forces played a role in
Leigh-Mallory decision making at
The crew of a German 20 mm antiaircraft gun searches for targets over
Dieppe, 19 August 1942.
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Top left: An air photo of Dieppe taken
during the battle. A large fire can
be seen burning in a building on the
seafront while other plumes of smoke
are created by the burning landing craft
on the beach.
Centre and bottom left: Scenes of the
air battle over Dieppe: A twin-engined
aircraft is photographed in its final
seconds before it plunges into the sea;
Lazy contrails trace the path of aircraft
on a summer day.

Churchill had to maintain good
relations with Charles de Gaulle and
the Free French forces based in the
UK. Finally, Churchill was politically
sensitive to the issue of civilian
casualties in occupied territory.76 The
impact of the sinking of the French
Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July
1940 had strained relations between
Britain and France and it remained an
important element of Vichy responses
to British actions.77 However, this did
not mean that targets in France, both
in Vichy and occupied-territory,
could not be attacked. A complex
relationship between the air staff,
relevant operational commands, the
War Cabinet and Churchill existed
to debate the merits of attacking
specific targets in occupied territory.
For example, the Renault factory at
Billancourt was attacked on 3 March
1942. However, the operational
conditions for this attack fit the
conditions laid down by the War
Cabinet. 78 Often discussions over
targets in France were protracted, as
with the attack on the Schneider works
at Le Creusot on 17 October 1942 that
was first suggested on 9 April. 79
Even into 1944, Churchill remained
concerned over attacking targets in
France. One of the underlying issues
concerning the Transportation Plan
was civilian casualties. Churchill
feared postwar retribution and it
took the threat of General Dwight
Eisenhower’s resignation to force
through acceptance of the plan. 80
Despite this Churchill quipped at
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
on 3 May 1944 that, “You will smear
11
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the good name of the Royal Air
Force across the world.”81 He also
telegraphed Roosevelt on 7 May to
express his, and the War Cabinets
concern over what he described as the
slaughter of French civilians.82
Additionally, the RAF lacked the
capability to attack pinpoint targets at
this stage of the war. The Butt Report
of August 1941 made it clear that
Bomber Command struggled to hit
targets. Only one in three attacking
aircraft hit within five miles of their
objective.83 The problem of precision
targeting had been identified as early
as 11 October 1939 when Air ViceMarshal Arthur Conningham noted
that his crews in No.4 Group were
having difficulty locating targets at
night. 84 Bomber Command would
adopt area bombing as it main

mode of operation until greater
scientific and navigational aids
became available from 1942 onwards.
Despite the problem of targeting,
Dieppe had been previously been
attacked, however, by the time of the
raid it was considered an unsuitable
target for the Bomber Command
main force. In 1943, Bomber
Command’s Operational Research
Section produced an assessment that
raised questions of the efficacy of the
command’s use based on its available
strength, effectiveness and nature of
the target.85 Dieppe was considered
a wasteful target given the force
requirements required to attack
it. This was a reasonable assertion
given the aim of Bomber Command.
While the use of heavy bombers
in support of ground operations

increased after 1943 they were
not always beneficial; operational
research reports questioned the
efficacy of their use for anything
other than morale reasons.86 Given
the geography of Dieppe, it is hard
to imagine what advantage the use of
heavy bombers would have actually
given the attackers.

Lessons Learnt

O

ne of the key issues raised by
Jubilee is that of whether the cost
was worth the sacrifice. Mountbatten
made rigorous attempts to defend
the necessity of the raid up to his
death. As late as 1974 he continued to
argue in the pages of the Journal of the
Royal United Services Institute (JRUSI)
that Jubilee had been a necessary

Canadian Forces Photo C3080

An RAF Boston (with its bomb bay doors open) flies over the naval task force at Dieppe. At least one ship is
in the process of laying a thick smoke screen to hide the vessels from German coastal batteries.
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Top: The use of heavy bombers was cancelled for the attack on Dieppe, American heavy
bombers were tasked with diversionary operations. Here, the crew of a US B-17 Flying
Fortress, “Dixie Demo” leave their aircraft following their participation in Operation
Jubilee.
Above: The air photo captures the explosion of bombs dropped by American B-17s on
the German aerodrome at Abbeville/Drucat on 19 August 1942. Key to the annotations:
A. Bombs bursting in the northern dispersal area; B. Bomb bursts in a dispersal area; C.
Bomb bursts on the northern end of the NE/SW runway; D. Bomb bursts on the eastern
end of the E/W runway; F. Bomb bursts on a light anti-aircraft position; H. Bomb bursts
on a heavy anti-aircraft position; I. Bomb bursts on the outskirts of the aerodrome.
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precursor to Operation Overlord
when he stated that countless lives
were saved during Overlord because
of the lessons learnt at Dieppe. 87
This post-facto defence of his own
actions was undoubtedly born out
the fact that, as his official biographer
noted, Dieppe was one of the two
great criticisms that blighted his
career.88 Indeed, the text of the JRUSI
article came from his address to
the Canadian Dieppe Veterans and
Prisoners of War Association on 28
September 1973 where he sought to
justify the reasons for the raid. It is
clear that this was specious reasoning
on the part of Mountbatten who tried
to stretch the verity of his claims by
ignoring other theatres of operation.
The attempt to analyse lessons
learnt from the operation began soon
after with Captain John HughesHallett, the Jubilee naval force
commander, supervising a quick
post-mortem process that saw the
production of a combined report
on the operation and a separately
produced “Lessons Learnt”
document. A key element of this
document was the reports by the
individual force commanders. LeighMallory submitted his report on 5
September 1942. In his covering letter
to Sir Archibald Sinclair, secretary of
state for air, Leigh-Mallory outlined
his view that in overall terms the
operation had been a success from
the perspective of the air force. 89
Leigh-Mallory praised the work
of the squadrons providing air
cover and noted that this “was
the most satisfactory part of the
Operation.” Notably Leigh-Mallory
also praised the work of the air-sea
rescue organisation that picked up 20
pilots in the course of the operation.90
Leigh-Mallory’s key concern related
to the provision of adequate aerial
recognition training for RN gunners
who had posed serious problems of
command and control (C2) for the
system then in place. While LeighMallory praised the standard of work
undertaken by his own controllers
13
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on both Calpe and Fernie it is clear
from the discussions both before
and after the operation that this was
a problem that had to be examined
in order to fully apply air power in
combined operations. 91 Given the
criticism in the historiography over
bombing it is interesting to note that
Leigh-Mallory’s comments on this
subject were purely of an operational
nature. He noted that bombing was
not as useful as smoke laying in initial
landing operations and that plans
to utilise the light bombers of No.2
Group to attack reinforcements had
come to nothing due to the lack of
German troop movement.92
Overall, various reports on Jubilee
highlighted three key conclusions on
the RAF experience. First, combined
operations could be used as a means
of drawing the Luftwaffe to battle,
thus, allowing Fighter Command
to attrite its strength. Second, there
was a need to improve the command
and control (C2) functions which
supported such operations. Finally,
there was a significant attempt to
address the utility of bombing as a
means of supporting such operations.
The “Lessons Learnt” report also
highlighted concerns over the scale
of operations, use of smoke, the
use of airborne forces as well as the
aforementioned issue of C2.93
Perhaps the least useful lesson
learnt was Leigh-Mallory’s attempt to
link the use of combined operations
to an offensive fighter strategy; in
effect, intruder-based operations
using commandos as bait rather
than bombers. This was not an
unreasonable conclusion given that
after Dieppe the Germans began
reinforcing positions in France and
Norway. Leigh-Mallory wrote to
Mountbatten on 22 August stating
that, “I feel that we might profitably
conduct a future operation on rather
different lines.” He saw the success of
No.4 Commando’s operation against
the Hess Battery as a blueprint for
future operations.94 Two operations
made it as far as the planning stage,
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/3

Operations Aflame and Coleman.
While there were advantages to this
type of operation, it was ultimately a
dead-end by late 1942 with prevailing
operational issues such as the impact
that weather would have on fighter
operations and bombing accuracy.95
However, in 1943 it received renewed
vigour when Operation Starkey,
a sham British and Canadian
amphibious invasion in the Boulogne
area of France, became an important
element of Operation Cockade, a plan
designed to pin down German forces
in Western Europe.96 Key to this was
the desire to bring the Luftwaffe
to battle. Starkey was launched on
16 August and culminated on 9
September. It sought to feign the
movement of a large number of
troops and to deceive the Germans
into believing that a major operation
was to take place in the area of
Boulogne.97 RAF Fighter Command
supplied 72 squadrons that provided
air cover and hoped to fight a major
air battle using a RN force as bait.
Ultimately, Starkey failed. It did
have an impact on the planning for
deception operations for Overlord,
in particular Fortitude South, which
was reconsidered in light of problems
of conception that plagued Starkey.
Deception had been at the core
of these planned operations with
Mountbatten claiming that Coleman
would be the deception plan for
Operation Torch.98 Starkey also began
to change the attitude prevalent in
the RAF that air superiority could
be gained during the course of a
combined operation. By Overlord,
it was recognized that this was a
prerequisite that would have to be
gained beforehand.
The force commanders in their
individual reports that formed
the Combined Report on Jubilee
highlighted the question of C2. 99
The key experience revolved around
the loss of HMS Berkeley, which
was sunk by the Luftwaffe because
of the RAF’s inability to engage
below 3,000 feet for fear of friendly

anti-aircraft fire from supporting
RN destroyers. 100 The problem of
C2 at such an intimate level of
operations had been highlighted in
the interwar years when HMS Nelson
had been used as a HQ ship during
exercises off the Yorkshire coast
in 1934.101 This was one of LeighMallory’s concerns after the debacle
of Exercise Yukon II in preparation
for Operation Rutter.102 This concern
led Mountbatten to initiate an interservice committee to explore the issue
in early 1942.103 The report led to the
development of HMS Bulolo and
Largs as headquarters ships, however
they were not available for Jubilee
and the attacking forces had to rely
on adapted destroyers that were not
sufficient for the job. Jubilee acted as a
trigger for the extended development
of the headquarters ship concept as it
illustrated the dire need for specialist
ships to serve in this role. This
was reinforced by Bulolo’s success
during Operation Torch. However,
it was clear that the headquarters
ships could not completely resolve
the complicated issues of C2 for air
operations. The ultimate result was
the development of fighter direction
tenders (FDTs) manned by specially
trained fighter direction officers.
FDTs were equipped with ground
control intercept radar and the
relevant intelligence streams to allow
the control of fighter aircraft over the
invasion area, a role that decreased
pressure on headquarters ships,
which took on a greater oversight
role in 1944. This revised system
would prove itself during Operation
Overlord.104
The problem of fire support
in combined operations was a key
lesson identified by Hughes-Hallett
who noted that the RAF part was
of vital importance.105 Throughout
late 1942, COHQ began studying the
question of fire support through its
Assault Committee, which simply
stated that, “In all stages of the action
all forms of air support would be an
urgent requirement.”106 A technical
29
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sub-committee was set-up to examine
“Whether the requirements of fire
support in assaults could be met by
bombing, gunfire from ships, or a
combination of both.”107 Despite the
obvious need to examine the issue
of aerial bombardment it was not
dealt with in any meaningful manner
until Leigh-Mallory raised the issue
at Exercise Rattle in June 1943. 108
Leigh-Mallory’s personal experience
of Jubilee clearly highlighted the
importance of aerial bombardment
to him. This line of experience in
conjunction with reports emanating
from the Mediterranean, in particular
Operation Corkscrew, the invasion
of the Italian island of Pantelleria,
would form a vital source of
information in the planning for
Overlord. Air Vice-Marshal Ronald
Graham formed an inter-service
committee under the auspices of
the Chiefs of Staff Committee to
examine the problem of fire support
for amphibious operations. This
committee submitted its report in
early 1944 and it emphasised the need
for the use of air power by noting
that all action would be joint, and
that the effort fell into three tasks:
silencing coastal defences; drenching
fire during the assault; and provision
of support during the build up of the
bridgehead.109

Conclusion –
Success or Failure?

I

t is clear that the debate over the
effectiveness of the RAF during
Jubilee remains contentious. A
broader analysis of the context
in which the RAF was operating
highlights the idea that the RAF did
indeed pursue the right strategy to
support Jubilee. RAF strategy stressed
the importance of air superiority and
it was widely accepted that this
was the overriding consideration
in combined operations. A simple
statistical analysis of losses does little
but misunderstand the problems of
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supporting combined operations
with offensive air power. Without
air cover, Jubilee would have been an
unmitigated disaster. Given that only
one ship, HMS Berkeley, was lost due
to bombing highlights its importance.
Indeed, Hughes-Hallett wrote that
“The fighter cover afforded by No.11
Group was magnificent and the…loss
of one ship…should be regarded as…
fortunate.”110
Contemporary Canadian views
highlight the complexity of the
operation and lessons learnt by the
RAF. Captain G.A. Browne of the
Royal Canadian Artillery, who served
as a forward observation officer,
commented on the cancelling of the
aerial bombardment to preserve the
element of surprise that:

afforded by air forces was faultless”
overstates the operation’s success, it
is clear that the RAF considered their
experience as positive and they did
learn lessons from Jubilee.114 In line
with developments from operations
in the Mediterranean, attempts
were made to integrate improved
C2 systems for future combined
operations. Additionally, scientific
attempts were made to examine how
bombing could be used to support
operations. Jubilee acted as a trigger
for developments that emerged
in the course of 1943 and these
improvements were evident during
Operation Overlord. However, the
path between failure at Dieppe and
success on D-Day was not the direct
line suggested by Mountbatten.

Further, is surprise easier to
obtain, than the preparatory heavy

Notes

air bombardment which in our
case would quite probably have
succeeded where surprise, or rather
the hope of surprise, failed?111

In contrast Lieutenant J.E.R. Wood of
the Royal Canadian Engineers, who
was captured on Red/White beach,
commented after the war that:
Some of our people later claimed
they never saw the Air Force. Of
course they didn’t. They were too
busy up top keeping the Luftwaffe
off us. I can truthfully say we were
not machine gunned on that beach
except by our own people after we’d
folded up. That means the R.A.F. did
its stuff.112

Conversely, the Luftwaffe’s 8th
Abteilung wrote that the key lesson
for the Allies lay in understanding
that air supremacy was what was
required in any future Combined
Operation.113 This is what the RAF
had been arguing since the early
1920s.
While the War Cabinet’s
conclusion that the “Support
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